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The forces came face to face at a place known as Bhangani, 10kms from Paonta Sahib. The Hill Rajas allied army numbered around 10,000 men while Guru Gobind Singh Ji initially had 2,000 men at his disposal. But before the battle broke out, 500 treacherous Pathans with their commander Bhikan Khan and equal number of men from the Udassi sect deserted Guru Ji’s Khalsa army. The former joined the opposing army and the latter were never heard of again. So, the ratio turned out to be practically 10:1
although Bhudhu Shah came to Guru Ji’s assistance with his sons and a contingent of troops.This ratio has more significance then as is does now, due to the mere fact that every soldier came in physical contact with the enemy during the course of the battle.
The enemy commanders by sheer body of numbers intended to storm the camps at Paonta Sahib earlier then anticipated to achieve surprise and capture it in a lightening attack by day. Since such a large scale was not anticipated in such short notice, all round defence of the most important ground could not be organised, and therefore, having given adequate defensibility to Gurus camp, Guru Gobind Singh Ji decided to meet the enemy at a known piece of ground where mock exercises and rehearsals of contingency plans has been conducted earlier. |
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The enemy was made to believe by counter intelligence moves that the Khalsa army was not stepping out of Paonta Sahib to give fight, therefore the enemy forces advanced without adequate caution. |
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Safeguarding the security of the rear i.e. Paonta Sahib under three able commanders namely Ram Kaur, Mehra and Kalla, Guru Sahib Ji divided the rest of his Singhs into three groups under Kirpal Chand, Sangho Shah and Bhudhu Shah with adequate reserves. |
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Reserves were suitably positioned and subsequently employed at the right time to tilt the odds to Guru Sahib Ji’s favour. |
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Commander Sangho Shah, under the personal guidance of overall commander in chief Guru Gobind Singh Ji, made the best tactical use of the ground and positioned his troops on the home bank of a steep ravine which served as a ramp for holding back the enemy forces and met the enemy on the ground of his choosing. |
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Before positioning his men, Guru Sahib Ji made use of the prevalent wind direction resulting in increase in the speed and consequently the range of the arrows which killed hundreds of enemy practically rolling down a steep hill. |
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The enemy at the pre-selected ground was engaged at three different points from different directions by well balanced jathas/groups resulting in the division of the enemies strength consequently thinning out of the enemies front. Confusion and panic reigned in the enemies ranks and gave a deceptive impression of the strength of Gurus ji’s troops. The correct positioning of artillery pieces – two wooden batteries*, which shelled stones and pounded the enemies exposed flanks had devastating effect.
(* Ram Singh, a mechanic from Banaras had made the cannons for Guru Sahib Ji from which balls were discharged with great effect during the battle – Macauiffe, The Sikh Religion) |
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The result of the battle was that it put the military preparedness of Guru Ji to the test and by his brilliant victory it emboldened his Sikhs to face the titanic struggle which lay ahead of them with added courage and confidence. |
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Lessons learnt from the battle were : |
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That rehearsed contingency plans with troops for the defence of vital ground had a far reaching effect on the course of the battle. |
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The commander’s constant effort and success to meet the enemy at the ground of his choosing has all chances of success.
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Counter intelligence manoeuvres can help achieve surprise. |
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Adequate reserves, their suitable positioning and employment at the right moment i.e. without showing the hand prematurely can tilt the heaviest of odds into ones favour. |
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Widespread, bold and daring attacks on the enemy, who although vastly superior in numbers forced them to deploy his forces in a manner that inherently thinned out his front lines and thus weakened them. |
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The deployment of artillery in a manner aimed to concentrate fire power on vulnerable parts of the enemy (instead of peppering the whole enemy) has a more devastating effect. |
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Intelligent use of obstacles may by natural or manmade or a combination of both, help impede the advancement of the enemy and thereby break his momentum. |
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Prevalent wind’s speed and direction, weather conditions must be kept in mind and corrections applied before employing weapons for accuracy and resultant advantage.
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Leadership |
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A leader can infuse great will and determination even amidst an atmosphere of gloom and defeat by personal presence and forceful expression. The desertion of the treacherous Pathans and Udassis group damped the spirits of the troops, but Guru Gobind Singh Ji’s fiery, courageously invigorating speech just before the battle helped equip his Singhs psychologically with renewed fervour, zeal and rare courage. |
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Personal example of bravery influences men more than anything else. Guru Gobind Singh Ji was wounded by Raja Hari Chand in the midst of battle, but Guru Ji unmindful of his wound arrowed Hari Chand to death and continued to be with his Sikhs during the entire course of the battle. |
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A commander can exercise substantial influence on the course of a battle only when he either has direct observation of the battle or has reliable means to appreciate it in its true perspective in order to direct the operation in an ever changing situation. Guru Gobind Singh Ji observed the progress of the battle from a vantage point and directed operations as well as personally going into battle with his troops. |
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