Relative strength – 10:1 The Muhgal army numbered 20,000 and Guru Ji’s 2,000 the majority of which were irregulars.
The Mughal forces of Sirhand having known the location of Guru Ji’s camp mounted an attack by day with an aim to wipe out irregular soldiers and to capture Guru Sahib Ji alive.
There was only one water point in the vicinity for miles around. As it was semi-desert terrain and the summer heat was reaching its peak Guru Ji knew of its importance and based his defences around the water hole.
Realistic mock defences or extended false frontages were established at a place in the direction of Sirhand reasonably away from the water source. Deceptive methods like stretching out of sheets on trees and shrubs attracted the Muhgal army and their commanders took it to be the enemy’s main camp.
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Khalsa soldiers numbering around 250 – including the forty soldiers who had earlier deserted Guru Sahib Ji in the great siege of Anandpur Shahib and had rejoined Guru Ji’s army, now poised to give their very best before laying down their lives out of sheer repentance and remorse – entrenched themselves well to form a perimeter defence with perfect camouflage and concealment. They engaged the Mughal army for the whole day.
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The Moghal army, after clearing the outer perimeter which they regarded as the main defences were tired and without water. At this opportune moment Guru Ji’s fresh cavalry contingent, suitably poised on the enemies route to the water hole, engaged it. With this daring attack the enemy became so disorganised that it was never possible for the enemy commander to reorganise and march upon the actual camp or defences of Guru Ji. |
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Tactical Lessons. |
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Water sources, points of communication and maintenance in the desert or semi-desert terrain are few and far apart, hence strategically important. Defence should therefore be based on or around axis of maintenance with an aim to deny the opposing forces accessibility to them. |
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False and deceptive but realistic extended frontages can lure the enemy to mount an attack and thus waste effort and time. |
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Good camouflage and concealment ensures security of defence and helps achieve surprise. Because of camouflage and concealment of the main defences of the Khalsa army, the enemy mistook and wasted time and effort on false frontages established on the only approach route available to the Mughal army. |
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Employment of fresh troops in order to maintain the momentum of attack against an exhausted and bruised enemy invariably disorganises and demoralises him. Only a 300 strong cavalry contingent for fresh troops attacked a thirsty and exhausted enemy numbering 16,000. This had a dramatic effect on the outcome of the battle. |
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Well dug-in forces, mentally prepared to do or die can inflict substantial damage to the enemy both in men and materials. Some 250 soldiers of the Khalsa engaged an enemy of 20,000 strong for the whole day. The enemy no doubt put each one to death, but in the bargain left approximately four thousand dead or wounded in the day long battle. |
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The commander’s appreciation of the ground factor in semi-desert terrain must have the main emphasis on available axis of communications, maintenance and strategic locations, such as water points. |
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An effective commander can organise even irregular troops and infuse within them indomitable will to do or die and achieve tangible results. Most of Guru Ji’s troops at Khirana were primarily peasants and artisans from the neighbouring areas who had rendered their services to Guru Sahib Ji. |
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After the defeat of the enemy at the battle of Muktsar, the Mughals realised the futility of their efforts and became so badly demoralised that they altogether gave up. Automatically, hostility towards Guru Sahib Ji and the Khalsa army vanished never to resurface again as long as Guru ji was alive. |
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